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Abstract
This paper presents data and analysis on the antipoverty effectiveness of safety nets in
eight rich nations using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).  We find that national
safety nets are quite varied and that the most expensive ones (in terms of budgetary cost) are also
the most effective.  The paper concludes with some suggestions for the construction of effective
safety nets in developing nations.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to review the recent evidence on the antipoverty
effectiveness and other characteristics of social protection for the poor in the rich nations of the
world.  We will show that a wide range of poverty rates and antipoverty policies can be found
amongst these countries.  Within each country a unique set of antipoverty policies combines with
other social protection policies to help reduce poverty.  We examine the ways in which various
types of policies: private (though perhaps regulated or mandated by governments) and public,
affect poverty amongst the overall population and amongst several key policy groups: middle
aged workers, including those who are fully or partially employed and those with no earnings (or
earners); childless and childful families (including solo parents); extended families (where living
together produces economies of scale to reduce poverty); and the elderly.
Our objectives are two fold: first, to describe the arithmetic effects of social protection
policies in poverty, and secondly to attempt to infer their lessons for the design of social
protection systems and safety nets in Latin America.  In so doing so, we discuss the
responsiveness of modern society to a number of social risks: traditional risks such as old age,
unemployment and disability, and new risks such as single parenthood, care for children when
parents are employed, and the effects of demographic cycles on the costs of aging societies.
We begin with a brief review of poverty concepts and measures and a brief description of
the data used in this paper.  This is followed by a presentation of the results, and finally by a
discussion of our findings and their implications for the design of Latin American social
protection systems.
2In the short space allotted to this paper, we are limited in the extent to which we can
examine different measures of poverty and specific programs.  We present results for a set of
rich nations at a point in time, with no direct analysis of poverty trend over time.  We do not
discuss social investments in health care, human capital, and education very much, despite the
fact that they may be the most effective of long-run anti-poverty policies for Latin America
(Inter-American Development Bank 1998; Lustig and Deutsch 1998).  We also concentrate on
money based poverty, with only a summary discussion of the effects of noncash benefits on
poverty.  And we limit our poverty measures to relative income based headcounts of the poor.
We are less concerned with this final limitation than if we were writing a paper on poverty
measurement where a number of poverty concepts and measures should be explored.  Yet,
because the antipoverty effects of social protection systems is similar whether one uses absolute
or relative poverty concepts, the main points we make in this paper can be argued regardless of
the poverty concept employed (Kenworthy 1998; Smeeding 1997).
II. Concepts of Well-Being, Poverty, and Resource Measures in
Rich and Poor Nations
The measurement of economic poverty in all nations, rich or poor, involves the
calculation of economic well-being or resources relative to needs.  Economic well-being refers to
the material resources available to households.1  The concern with these resources is not with
material consumption itself but rather with the capabilities they give household members to
participate in their societies (Sen 1992).  These capabilities are inputs to social activities and
participation in these activities produces a particular level of well-being (Rainwater 1990;
Coleman and Rainwater 1978).  Measurement of these capabilities differs according to the
3context in which one chooses to measure them, particularly within rich nations as compared to
within poor nations.
All advanced or rich societies are highly stratified socially.  Some individuals have more
resources than others.  The opportunities for social participation are vitally affected by the
resources that the family disposes, particularly in nations like the United States, where there is
heavy reliance on the market to purchase such social goods as health care, education, and child
care services (Rainwater 1974).  Money income is the central resource in these societies.  But
there are still other important kinds of resources such as social capital (Coleman 1988), noncash
benefits, education, and access to basic health care, all of which add to human capabilities.
There are also many forces in rich societies which reduce well-being by limiting capabilities to
participate fully in society: for instance, violent, geographically and socially isolated
neighborhoods; poor quality public education.  And earnings and job instability increases
economic insecurity in many rich countries.
In poor nations, where poverty is more basic—often the difference between life and
death—real consumption of food and shelter is the preferred measure of well-being.  Economic
poverty emerges and is measured by having too few resources for survival, or living on life’s
edge.  Here life expectancy, mortality rates at young ages, lack of access to public health,
illiteracy, and other basic measures of “poverty” and social exclusion are much more common
and more easily measured than is “income.  And “social capital” in the form of family support
may be the major form of social protection in developing nations, particularly in rural
communities.  In fact, such organizations as the United Nations (1997, 1998) seem to have
adopted such an approach via their measurement of “human development indices “ for poor
nations.2
But in rich societies, we argue that income—or the ability to consume—is the key
measure of economic resources and the ability to avoid poverty.  While income—consumption
4plus change in net worth—brings with it more complicated issues of period of measurement and
life cycle considerations, it is a much more appropriate and, we would argue, more easily
measured index of well-being for rich nations than is consumption (see Johnson and Smeeding
1997 on this topic).  Further, an emphasis on “income” in addition to consumption, allows
researchers to focus not only on today’s consumption but also on ability to protect future
consumption, i.e., “savings’ and access to credit markets.  International bodies such as the World
Bank, which emphasize individual, responsibility and self-protection for risks of economic
downturn must examine not just consumption but also savings and access to credit markets (e.g.,
Holtzmann and Jorgensen 1999).
In rich nations one measures poverty based on annual disposable money income.
Detailed comparable information exists on money income by source, taxes paid, and certain
kinds of transfers which have a cashlike character, such as housing allowances, fuel assistance,
and food stamps, for the almost 25 nations, 9 of which we will investigate here.  Unfortunately
we cannot take into account the major in-kind benefits which are available in most countries—
for example, health care, education, day care and preschool, general subsidies to housing, and the
like.  To the extent that the level and distribution of these resources is different in different
countries, our analysis of money income must be treated with some caution.  While, their
inclusion would be attractive to those interested in capabilities and their effects on longer term
poverty (e.g., Ravallian 1998), we are interested here in the effects of safety nets on poverty.
Hence, we prefer a measure of poverty which focuses on the short term responsiveness of
governments and other agencies in providing social protection to the otherwise poor.
Equivalence Scales
Households differ not only in terms of resources but also in terms of their needs.  We take
differing needs, due to differences in household size and other factors (e.g., urban-rural
differences), into account by adjusting income for family size using an equivalence scale.  The
5adjustment for household size is designed to account for the different requirements families of
different sizes and different circumstances have for participating in society at a given level.
Different equivalence scales will yield different distributions of well-being.  Several studies in
Europe, the United States, and Australia point to an equivalence scale which implies fairly large
economies of scale in the conversion of money incomes to social participation among families
with children (Buhmann et al. 1988; Bradbury 1989; Rainwater 1990), and also for the aged
(Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz 1996).  Because choice of equivalence scale may favor small
versus large families, depending on which scale is selected, we aim to find a middle ground
value which is appropriate for measuring vulnerability for both large families (e.g., those with
two or more children) and smaller units (e.g., single elderly women living alone).
Buhmann et al. (1988) have proposed that disposable income be adjusted for family size
in the following way:
Adjusted income = Disposable Income/SizeE (1)
The equivalence elasticity or “equivalence factor” E, varies between 0 and 1; the larger is E, the
smaller are the economies of scale assumed by the equivalence scale.  The various studies
reviewed in the survey from Buhmann et al. (1988) and later Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding
(1995) make use of equivalence scales for analyses of per capita income ranging from E = 0 (or
no adjustment for size), to E=1 (which ignore all economies of scale).  Between these extremes,
the range of possible values is evenly covered.  The reader should keep in mind that all money
income estimates in the paper are based on adjusted or equivalent income calculated according to
the above formula.
The obvious question is which measure of E to use for this study.  Following Atkinson,
Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995, especially chapters 2, 3, and 7), we have selected an E value of
0.5, similar to that used by OECD (Forster 1994), and Eurostat (Hagenaars et al. 1994).  For the
6most part, national rankings by overall poverty rates are not sensitive to the measure of E
selected (Burkhauser, Merz, and Smeeding 1996; Smeeding, 1997).
However, subgroup poverty rates are very sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale.
As demonstrated in Appendix Figure A-1 for Spain, poverty rates among the elderly (usually
small families in rich nations) and children (larger families, particularly in developing nations
and in richer Catholic nations) vary systematically according to the level of the equivalence
factor.  When E=0, there are complete economies of scale and smaller households have higher
poverty rates (due to the correlation between income and household size) than do larger ones.
The opposite result is obtained at higher levels of the equivalence factor, all the way to E=1
where there are no economies of scale and each additional person needs as much as the next
person to be nonpoor.  Two important notes can be added here.  First of all, this same
relationship obtains for every rich nation.  The crossing of the lines in Figure A-1 is not unique
to Spain.  Secondly, there is far too little research on the appropriate measure of E in developing
nations.  Simplistic nations of poverty such as “$1.50 per person per day” imply E=1 equivalence
scales and hence the likely family size biases apparent in Figure A-1 (World Bank 1990;
Ravallion et. al. 1991).
Having defined equivalent income in this way, we determine the equivalent income of all
households and all individuals in each country.  We then examine the distribution of equivalent
incomes of households and of persons in households in relation to the selected poverty line.  That
is we tabulate both the percentage of persons who have given characteristics, and the percentage
of households with given characteristics.  In technical terms, our person calculations are
weighted by the number of persons of each type (all persons including children, adults, elderly),
residing in each household type.
7Poverty Measurement
Needs can be measured two ways, an absolute definition and a relative definition.
Relative poverty involves deciding on the income concept for relativity (median or mean) and on
the fraction of adjusted income which signifies poverty.  Absolute poverty measurement means
locating the “absolute” poverty line and then converting that poverty line into national currency.
We rely here on a relative concept of poverty, the percent of persons living with incomes
below half of median income.  This income is in line with a well-established theoretical
perspective on poverty (Sen 1992; Townsend 1979).  Such a measure is now commonly
calculated by the European Commission (Hagenaars et. al. 1994; Ramprakash, 1995), by the
OECD (Förster 1993) and by other international groups.  Only the British and one other major
international study (Cantillion, Marx, and van den Bosch 1996) use a fraction of mean income as
a standard, though Cantillion et al. use both mean and median income-based poverty rates in
their study.
In fact, most studies use the “average” or median household as the point of reference, as
do we.  Using the average or mean income means measuring social distance from something
other than the average household.  Moreover, the decision to use one measure versus the other
can lead to quite different results in poverty trends when inequality is changing.  In the United
States from 1973 to 1994, the mean income grew 15 percent more than the median income, thus
assuring that poverty measured relative to the mean grew much more than poverty relative to the
median (Burtless 1996).
Our measure of poverty is the headcount, i.e., percent of households or persons with
incomes less than half of the median income.  We use only the headcount in this paper, although
measures of poverty gap or more sophisticated measures of poverty such as the Forster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGH) (1984) and Sen (1976) index could be deployed.  Were the purpose of this
paper poverty measurement, would stress more measures of both absolute and relative poverty.
8However, poverty measurement is not the major purpose of the paper.  And in practice, each of
the other measures of poverty suggested above may have severe computational problems.  For
instance, the poverty gap, FGH, and Sen indexes are all very sensitive to the accuracy of the
income measure at the bottom of the income ladder. Differences in survey reporting, survey
editing and bounding of incomes by survey agencies may each drastically affect these measures
of poverty as they in effect, artificially create different lower bound income figures across
nations.
The determination of “absolute” poverty lines requires both the selection of an absolute
poverty line in one currency and its translation into other currencies.  Such translations rely on
“purchasing power parties (PPP’s) such as those constructed by Hester and Summers (1991) or
by OECD (1998).  However, PPP’s are based on aggregated data and income (consumption)
concepts that are not well suited for use with microdata, which are highly sensitive to the price
deflator used when rapid inflation (as is often the case in Latin America) takes place and which
are sensitive to the overall quality of the income data reported on the survey in question.  Hence,
we rely on the relative poverty-based headcount measure alone.3
While we stress the half of median measure, we use one additional measure of relative
poverty to test the sensitivity of our headcount measures to alternative poverty lines.  Forty
percent of the median is chosen for comparison because it is almost exactly the ratio of the
United States poverty line to the United States median.  This poverty measure is used in Figure 1
and Table A-3 below.
Measuring Resources:  Disposable Income, Market Income and Independent
Income Measures
Cross-national comparisons of poverty have focused primarily on the distribution of
disposable money income after direct taxes (income and employee payroll) and after transfer
payments.4  While this definition of post-tax and transfer disposable income is broad, it falls
9considerably short of the Haig-Simons comprehensive income definition, typically by excluding
much of capital gains, imputed rents, home production, and in-kind income (including
employment related benefits).5  Most cross-national studies of poverty employ either a measure
of income gross of all taxes, or a measure that subtracts “direct taxes”—income and employee
payroll taxes—alone.  In general, studies do not count personal property or wealth taxes as direct
taxes.  Employer payroll taxes are implicitly assumed to fall on employees, and indirect taxes are
ignored.6
Measuring the Effects of Policy on Poverty
Because we want to measure the efforts of public policy on poverty alleviation, we also
examine the impact of public taxes and transfers on well-being by estimating the percent of
persons with incomes below half of adjusted median disposable income based on their adjusted
Market Incomes (MI).  MI includes all forms of earnings (wages, salaries, and self-employment
income) plus capital income.  Next we factor in “private transfers,” including occupational
pension benefits, inter household transfers, and private transfers such as child support.  Private
Income Transfers therefore includes everything but government transfers and taxes.  We also
separate out the effects of two types of transfers on poverty: Universal and Social Insurance
Transfers, including such items as child allowances and unemployment, disability and old age
insurance.  Next the effects of payroll and income Taxes are estimated as defined above.
Finally, Social Assistance, or means-tested and emergency benefits are counted.  The latter
category includes cash and near cash transfers which are assumed equivalent to cash income.
These near-cash benefits include such items as food stamps in the United States and housing
allowances in Sweden, each of which are easily measured in national currency terms.  Once we
have added these together, we reach Disposable Personal Income or DI, which includes all
types of income, including taxes and transfers.
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These comparisons are designed to illustrate how universal benefits, social insurance, and
social assistance “welfare” programs—the social safety net—help reduce poverty.  They also
tells us how the tax system, including negative taxes such as refundable personal tax credits (e.g.,
the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the United Kingdom’s Family Tax
Credit), help raise the incomes of some families relative to others.
Because poverty is of greater concern when it is concentrated among vulnerable groups
(children, aged, unemployed) as compared to others (e.g., able childless adults), we present
poverty rates for several groups as well as for all persons (Figures 1 and 2 and Table A-2).  We
first consider household poverty rates amongst households headed by a prime age adult (aged 25
to 64).  Here we break the aggregates into three groups: those with a head or a spouse working
full year-full time (to assess wage adequacy); those with only part-time workers (head or spouse)
as a residual; and those with no earners (who are either full year unemployed or not into the labor
force, including the totally disabled).  These analyses clearly focus on the question of whether or
not participation in the labor market can by itself reduce poverty and also how social protection
affects poverty amongst working age households.
We then turn (Table 2) to poverty amongst adults (all persons aged 25 to 64) broken
down into various demographic categories:  couples (two adults present); and “extended
families” (multigenerational families with children and adult other than the head and partner).
These are compared to childless prime age adults (adults 21-64 in households with out children)
and to the elderly (adults age 65 and over).  We do not directly assess child poverty in this paper.
All income and poverty definitions are more completely summarized in Appendix Table A-1.
Database
The database used to carry out this analysis is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
database, which now contains information on child poverty for 25 nations in 80 databases
covering the period 1967 to 1996 (see LIS homepage at http://lissy.ceps.lu/index.htm and
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Figure A-2).  The LIS consists of a set of existing household income microdatasets which have
been “harmonized” (categories of income and demography are made consistent) producing
output files which are more comparable than are the raw files.  While the LIS process certainly
raises the ratio of “signal” to “noise” in crossnational comparisons of income, poverty and
economic well-being, some of the noise remains.  Hence, footnotes on noncomparabilities that
have been reduced but not eliminated still are worthy of note.7
From the list of 25 rich LIS nations (Appendix Figure A-2) we have selected nine to
examine here:  Three young large Anglo Saxon nations with “underdeveloped” welfare states
(United States, Australia, Canada); five European nations (United Kingdom, Spain, France,
Germany and The Netherlands) which span their social policy spectrum; and one “advanced”
Scandinavian welfare state (Sweden).  While other choices of nations were available, this set
fairly well represents the types of social protection systems available in rich nations.8
III. Results
Our purpose is to assess the relative levels of poverty across the selected nations and the
effect of social protection systems on these societies.  We begin with two all-inclusive figures
(based on Table A-2) which paint the broad outline of poverty patterns and anti-poverty effects
across these nations.  These pictures help set the stage for the detailed results that follow.
Overview
There is a wide range of relative income-based poverty rates based on disposable income
(DI) for all persons across these nine countries as seen in Figure 1 (derived from Table A-2).
The United States is clearly the outlier at either the 40 or 50 percent poverty line, with an 18.4
percent rate at our preferred 50 percent of median standard.  Australia comes next at 15.7 percent
and then a grouping of the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, and France all in the 10 to 12
12
percent range.  Finally, poverty is lowest in (West) Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands, all
in the 6 to 7 percent range.  At the more stringent 40 percent poverty standard, only the United
States has poverty in double digits, while Australia has an 8 percent rate.  The next four nations
(United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, and France) are all around the 6 percent poverty level, while
the lowest three (Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands) are all around 4 percent.  Beyond the
United States and Australia, which always rank highest, and The Netherlands which is always
lowest (or tied for lowest), there is no unique ranking.  But while country-by-country rankings
vary by the level of median income at which poverty is measured, three or four distinct
groupings of nations, and large differences across these nations are apparent in Figure 1.  The
range of poverty rates varies by two to three times across the extremes depending on which level
of poverty line is selected.
Market income (MI) based poverty rates (Figure 2) are more closely clustered than are
DI-based rates, with all countries facing pre-tax and transfer poverty rates of between 30 and 38
percent at the 50 percent of median poverty standard.  The antipoverty effects of taxes and
transfers, however, differ greatly.  In fact, the United States and Australia begin with the two
lowest MI-based poverty rates, but end up with the highest DI-based rates (see dark bars in
Figure 2).  Canada begins at a point close to the United States figure, but then ends up with a
better after-tax and transfer poverty rate.  In the low DI poverty countries (e.g., Sweden and The
Netherlands, but also France and Germany), there is a much larger antipoverty effect, but also a
larger “target” MI-based pre-tax and transfer poverty group.  The patterns at the 50 percent level
are largely similar to those at the 40 percent poverty level.
A closer look at Table A-2 itself indicates that in every nation with the exception of
Australia and the United Kingdom, universal and social insurance transfers have by far the
largest impacts on poverty. In the United Kingdom, social assistance also has a large and roughly
equal effect on poverty.  While all other nations make use of social assistance payments, they
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play a far less significant role than does social insurance in most nations.  In every nation, private
transfers play a small positive role, while taxes play a small negative roll, but neither is a prime
mover for poverty reduction.   In the expansive welfare states of Sweden, Germany, France, and
even in Spain, social insurance benefits account for 80 percent or more of the poverty reduction
derived from the social protection system.  In Canada, The Netherlands, and the United States,
about two-thirds of the anti-poverty effect can be attributed to social insurance and universal
transfers.
Social insurance includes old age and survivors benefits, temporary and permanent
disability payments, unemployment compensation, and in some countries, maternity allowances.
Universal benefits include child allowances, maternity allowances and in some countries,
guaranteed child support (child support assurance).  Because the effects of social insurance may
be dominated by one or more of these specific types of benefits, it behooves us to take a closer
look at which types of benefits are most prevalent, and which packages have the greatest impact
on poverty.  We accomplish this decomposition by examining impacts by more detailed
demographic groups in the next section of the paper.  We are not able to complete a program-by-
program analysis for each type of social assistance or social insurance benefit.  Indeed, because
there is no one particular type of social protection instrument which dominates across several
nations, such a detailed analysis would be fruitless in any case.  Rather we seek to demonstrate
the general type of programs which affect the poor and to document the extent of the impacts for
each type.
The preliminary figures suggest hat there may be a relationship between social protection
efforts (e.g., as measured by the percent of GDP spent on cash social protection) and reductions
in poverty.  Indeed, Figures 3A and 3B indicate that when one examines the percentage change
in poverty from MI to DI (as in Tables A-2, and Tables 1 and 2 following), and compare it to
social protection expenditures (e.g., those from the OECD 1999),9 among the nonelderly
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(Figure 3A) and among all persons including the elderly (Figure 3B), there is a strong
relationship between social protection budgetary efforts and poverty reduction.  In general,
higher spending produces lower poverty rates.  And this overall relationship (Figure 3B) is not
solely driven by social retirement expenses because the result also holds true for the nonelderly
(Figure 3A).10  In both charts the United States is an outlier, suggesting that it not only spends
little on social protection (relative to GDP) but also that this spending is not well targeted to the
otherwise poor (as denoted by its being far below the trend line in Figure 3A and 3B).  For
instance, among the nonelderly, Australia has a larger but still below average anti-poverty impact
for roughly the same level of expenditure, while among all persons, they drop closer to the
United States level.11  And among the mid-level countries in terms of expenditures and poverty
reduction, on the nonelderly, France seem to achieve a larger impact than the United Kingdom,
Germany, or Canada.  Sweden and The Netherlands achieve high levels of poverty reduction, but
they also spend large fractions of GDP on social protection.  To investigate these results more
closely, we now turn to the more detailed results.
Working Age Household Poverty and Social Protection
We begin by examining the effects of social protection on poverty among households
headed by middle aged (aged 25 to 64) householders (household heads).  Because of the
importance of labor market income supplements, we break this group into three subgroups in
each country:
(a) households with either the head or spouse working full-year, full-time
(b) households with neither the head nor the spouse employed (“no earner” households)
(c) households with a part-time employed head or spouse (or both) and with neither
working full-year full-time (the residual of (a) and (b) above).
Overall poverty rates are also tabulated.  In Table 1 we examine the household (not the person).
Because countries often try to construct “income packages” for different types of households
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whereby all earnings, social insurance, and other factors are taken into account (see Rainwater,
Smeeding, and Danziger 1997) one could argue that the household is the proper accounting unit
and poverty reference group.12  The breakdown into these types is to help tell us how various
labor market groups are affected by the social protection systems in each country.13  In both
Table 1 and Table 2, column A presents MI poverty rates, column E presents DI poverty rates,
and the final column presents the overall percent reduction in poverty from MI to DI.
There are both large and subtle differences across countries in these results (Table 1).
One of the most clear findings is that full-year full-time workers begin with low poverty rates
and improve from there.  The highest poverty rates among this group (United States, 6.2 percent;
Australia, 3.3 percent; Canada, 2.9 percent) are also low wage countries, i.e., those with a large
fraction of workers earning less than two-thirds of the median wage (Smeeding 1997a).  But
even in these countries and for full-year full-time workers, the tax transfer system further reduces
poverty.  DI poverty is less than MI poverty in each nation.
At the other end of the spectrum, nonearners almost by definition, have extremely high
MI poverty rates and hence must rely on the transfer system to bring these above the poverty
level.  Since the “no-earners” can run as high as 20 to 30 percent of all such households (e.g., see
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands in Table A-4), this is a major problem in some nations.
Both social insurance and social assistance are combined to bring about large poverty reductions
in some nations for this group (e.g., The Netherlands, Sweden), while those who do not have
such strong institutions are much less likely to reduce poverty rates to reasonable levels (e.g., the
United States).
In between these extremes, we find part-time (or part-year) worker households where
again outcomes vary according to the strength of the social protection system.  Resulting DI
poverty rates vary from 3.5 to 35.4 percent for this group, with social insurance playing the
strongest role in poverty reduction efforts.
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In every country , private income transfers and taxes play small, offsetting roles with
taxes raising poverty by 1 to 2 percentage points, and private transfers having the opposite effect.
The overall results at the bottom of each country’s breakdowns reflect these patterns (and also
the relative numbers of households in each of the three categories).  In almost all of the
countries, social insurance benefits, disability, unemployment, child allowances, workers
compensation, and maternity benefits play the largest role in reducing poverty.  Only in
Australia, which has a set of expansive income-tested social assistance schemes, and in the
United Kingdom where income-tested social assistance benefits are a relatively large part of the
safety net, do we find that social insurance is not the largest source of poverty reduction.  In all
the rest of these nations, social insurance transfers provide two-thirds or more of the anti-poverty
effect of the social protection system.
Adults and Elderly by Family Type
Another way to examine the effects of social protection is to look at individual adults
according to their household living arrangement status, not their work status (Table 2).  Different
nations treat adults in different ways depending on their family situation:  presence or absence of
children; presence or absence of other adults (extended families or solo parents).  Because older
retired households also receive large amounts of social transfer, we examine the population aged
65 and over as well.14
The most striking findings here are the diversity of social transfer effectiveness across the
population types and the continued importance of social insurance transfers in most nations.
Adults aged 25 to 64 (Table 2) not surprisingly look by and large like adult households with
heads in the same prime age range:  social insurance drives the antipoverty system (with the
exception of Australia and the United Kingdom).  Overall, there is a wide range in adult MI and
DI poverty rates, with the latter ranging from 3.1 percent in Sweden to 15.4 percent in the United
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States.  Among childless adults and extended families, this same pattern persists:  wide ranging
DI poverty rates and social insurance as the primary anti-poverty tool.
Among families with children, social assistance plays a somewhat larger role.  Couples
with children still rely heavily on social insurance, but the presence of children adds to the role
of social assistance in most nations, especially in the United Kingdom, but also in Canada,
France, and Sweden.  Childful couples have DI poverty rates that range from 2 percent in
Sweden to double digits in Australia (10.6 percent), Spain (10.9 percent), the United States (11.8
percent), and the United Kingdom (12.3 percent).
Single parents are a quite varied group with MI poverty rates from 40 percent in Sweden
to 78 percent in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands and with DI poverty rates ranging
from 4 percent in Sweden to over 50 percent in Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United
States.  Even in France and The Netherlands, sole parent poverty rates run in the 28 to 30 percent
range.  In France, Germany, and The Netherlands, we find that social assistance now tops social
insurance in its antipoverty effect for solo parents.  Clearly most nations have not done well in
providing social protection to this vulnerable group.  In Sweden (and in Norway, Finland, and
Denmark, not shown here), MI-based poverty rates run below DI-based poverty rates in many
other nations, indicating that Sweden (and to some extent also France and Spain) have found a
way to encourage single parents to become more self-supporting through part-time or full-time
work, thus reducing MI poverty by more than in other nations.
While the elders are a much better protected group in all nations except Sweden where
everyone is well-protected, a wide range of DI poverty rates emerge, ranging from almost 33
percent in Australia (where an income-tested benefit system substitutes for social retirement) to
below 5 percent in The Netherlands.  Only Canada and Germany also have single digit elder
poverty rates.  In the United States 22.7 percent of elders are poor as are 13 to 17 percent of
elders in Spain, Germany, and France.  For the first time, we see that private transfers, here in the
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form of occupational pensions, have a large role in reducing poverty, especially in The
Netherlands, but also in the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States.  Social
retirement still plays the largest role, but in Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and
Spain, social assistance also plays a not-insignificant role among the elderly.
Summary
The LIS data reveal a rich and varied pattern of social protection among the nations
examined here.  Self-protection, in the form of low MI or pre-tax and transfer poverty rates
produces the best results for childless couples, extended families, and households with at least
one full-time earner.  While they may not always be classified as a social protection, the labor
market and the extended family are clearly a strong anti-poverty device in all rich nations.  Full
employment policies and extended family have definite measurable economic benefits.
Private transfers and taxes largely offset one another for most nonelderly groups. Social
assistance plays a large and often significant role in many nations (e.g., Australia, the United
Kingdom) and for some specific groups (e.g., single parents, elderly).  But it is the overall
expense, extent and generosity of the social insurance system that provides the bulk of
antipoverty effect for working age adults (including those who are not at all employed) and for
the elderly in all nations (with the singular exception of Australia).  While many nations have
responded well to the “traditional” needs for social protection, e.g., old age, extended
unemployment, disability, not all have done so.  And only Sweden, and to a far lesser extent
France, Spain, and The Netherlands, appear to have dealt at all well with social protection
against the “new risk” of single parenthood (Overbye 1997).
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IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The ultimate question posed for this paper seems to be what, if any, lessons can social
protection policy for the poor in Latin America take from the social protection policies and
results in the developed world?  The short answer is “that depends.”
Expansive social insurance systems are a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, large
amounts of social protection have strong antipoverty effects as demonstrated above.  While
extensive social assistance systems prevent widespread poverty for most groups, without the
problems of stigma or take-up found in social assistance schemes, three negative factors
associated with these programs need also be taken into account: their aggregate expense; their
effect on labor markets; and the current nonsustainability of social insurance for the aged in pay
as you go pension schemes.  I will deal with each in turn.
As seen in Figure 3, the more that a nation spends on social protection, the better the anti-
poverty effects for working age adults and for the elderly and near elderly.  But social protection
is expensive: more than 12 percent of GDP for cash programs for the nonelderly alone in The
Netherlands and Sweden; 18 to 21 percent of GDP or more in overall elderly and nonelderly cash
outlays for the Untied Kingdom, France, and Germany; and 25 percent or more in Sweden and
The Netherlands.  And this does not count public expenditure for health care or public education!
These astounding outlays have large effects on labor markets in three ways.
First and foremost, large social retirement systems, complete with early retirement (at
aged 55 or over) in the guise of disability transfers or unemployment insurance (or clearly stated
as “early retirement” or “unemployment retirement” benefits) have reduced labor force
participation for men at relatively young ages throughout Europe and Scandinavia.  One striking
statistic:  only 16 percent of Dutch men aged 61 or over participate in the labor force; in The
Netherlands, France, Germany, and many other European nations, the fraction of men who work
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is now less than 35 percent for 62-year-olds (e.g., see Gruber and Wise 1998; Quinn and
Smeeding 1998).  The extension of early retirement benefits leads to work stoppage in every
nation studied, but especially in the high unemployment nation of northern and central Europe
where “joblessness” is passively fought by finance ministers and social ministers with social
insurance programs which effectively remove most older workers from the labor market.  In the
face of ever expanding life expectancy in old age, these policies suggest the strong possibility of
near future fiscal catastrophe as suggested below.
Second, extended unemployment benefits are notorious for their negative effects on work
and labor supply behavior in such wide ranging nations as Poland (Schmidt and Gora 1998) and
Canada (Lemieux and Macleod 1998).  Another rule of thumb here is the more recent the study,
the greater the negative effects of social insurance on labor markets.  Disability insurance at
younger ages has similar impacts in every rich nation (Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong 1996).
Finally, income-tested (or means-tested) social assistance has negative effects on work in
most nations, though these are probably of a lesser magnitude than is popularly believed.  Some
nations, e.g., Sweden, France, have found good ways to mix work and income support for low
income single parents (or couples).  Most nations, however, e.g., the United Kingdom, have not
done well on this front, creating social assistance systems with severe work disincentives or so-
called “poverty traps.”  Whether United States style “welfare reform” will work in these nations
is open to question.
Most of the “classic” studies of the work-reducing effects of social transfers are either out
of date (e.g., Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981) or focus to a large extent on the third type
of problem mentioned above—i.e., social assistance—at the expense of extended unemployment
or retirement income studies.  The work-reducing effects of early retirement are largely ignored
by such studies as Atkinson and Mogenson (1993), Burtless and Haveman (1987), and Moffitt
(1992).
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The third major shortcoming of expansive pay-as-you-go social insurance systems for the
elderly is their economic and demographic unsustainability.  The United States publicly worries
about a projected 2 percent of GDP shortfall between revenues and expenses for social
retirement in the year 2030.  The Germans, French, Canadians, and Dutch only wish their
situation was so favorable!  Early retirement and generous benefits mix with ever-growing life
expectancy at older ages and declining birthrates to produce revenue shortfalls of 4 to 6 percent
of GDP for social retirement schemes over this same horizon in these nations (Smeeding and
Sullivan 1998).  Even at this time, attempts to raise retirement ages, cut pensions, or build-in
added tiers for occupational retirement are meeting increased resistance.
Finally, we should mention the “new risks” of rich societies:  social protection for single
parents and work enabling policies for mothers, married and unmarried (Overbye 1997).  Few
western nations have met this challenge in a meaningful way.  Child support by absent parents is
either largely unpaid (United States, Canada) or subsumed by “advance maintenance” social
insurance benefits which provide for guarantees in the absence of payment by absent parents
while more-or-less ignoring the parental obligation (Skovik 1997).  The problems of adequate
levels of support for single parents is an issue which is unsolved by most rich societies (e.g.,
Smeeding, Ross, England, Christopher, and McLanahan 1998).
And so what advice can be offered for social protection design in Latin America?  First
and foremost, it seems that social investments in education and health care will pay long-run
dividends in the form of higher rates of economic growth with wider spread benefits than in the
past.  The demography of Latin America (Duryea and Székely 1997) is poised for such growth as
seen from the supply side. While poverty and inequality are peaking in the 1990s in many Latin
American nations (Londono and Székely 1997; Lustig and Deutsch 1998), and while the benefits
of economic growth have not yet trickled down to the poor, self-protection via employment
growth seems a prudent long-run policy, and one that may eventually form the economic base for
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formal (and ultimately expensive) systems of social protection.  The demographics of Latin
America offers the opportunity to benefit from economic growth in the near-term, before the
issue of population aging comes along in the middle of the new century before us.  The challenge
will be to better spread the benefits of this growth among the lower classes—a problem not
unlike that which faces the United States (e.g., Ravallion 1997; Smeeding 1997; Burtless 1998).
Social protection systems that stress self-reliance seem next on the pecking order.  From
micro-credit programs to defined contribution pension plans, more savings and targeted savings
programs can provide an economic base for capital accumulation and growth and a self-
insurance-based safety net for working families.  One key factor in this development, however, is
the creation of sound, reliable and noncorrupt institutions which provide both pension assurance
and boost public confidence (Holzman 1998; Mitchell 1998).  Such schemes should increase
economic growth and produce a self-funded pension scheme which, in time, will provide for old
age poverty protection.
Finally, as national incomes grow, Latin America could begin to institute some of the
social protection institutions found in the developed world.  Smart policy designers will focus on
programs which compliment and encourage work to a greater extent than traditional programs
(e.g., the United States’ EITC) or programs which provide an extra modicum of assistance for
larger families (e.g., child allowances).  In general, social insurance and social assistance
schemes need be carefully designed to avoid the disincentive effects found in many western
societies and hence, their sometimes overwhelming expense.
The challenge is, of course, to find more efficient ways to establish effective systems of
social protection which eradicate poverty, are of modest cost, and which encourage work, thrift
and other means of self-protection.  So far, no single nation has fully met this challenge.
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Endnotes
1. We use the terms household and family interchangeably.  Our formal unit of aggregation
is the household—all persons living together and sharing the same housing facilities—in
almost all nations.  Only in Sweden does the “household” refer to a more narrow
definition of the “family” unit.
2. Another method is the aggrative poverty measurement approach whereby individuals
place themselves on an economic ladder from poor to rich.  For an application to Russia,
see Ravallion and Lokshin (1998).
3. For poverty studies using absolute poverty rates, see Kenworthy (1998), Danziger and
Jantti (1998), and Blackburn (1993).  For more on the vagaries of using PPP’s to adjust
“real” poverty lines, see Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998); Smeeding (1997).
4. Direct taxes are most often estimated from tax imputation models rather than official tax
records.  For example, the after-tax data for Australia, Germany, and the United States
are obtained using a tax imputation model at the level of the individual household to
estimate direct taxes.  Sweden uses official records of taxes paid.
5. Still, this definition is broader than some.  For instance, the United States Census
Bureau’s annually reported household income and poverty statistics use data from the
United States Current Population Survey that include cash transfers but exclude taxes,
thus making it difficult to ascertain the long-term effects of even income taxes on income
inequality in the United States. United States Bureau of the Census (1998).
6.. Because of differential reliance on employer and employee social security contributions
across nations, and because of the differential mix of personal, business, earnings,
income, property, and goods (expenditure, V.A.T., sales) taxes across rich nations, the
manner in which taxes are collected may have some effect on the results of cross-national
comparative analyses of poverty.  But in order to calculate the burden of indirect taxes, a
great deal of additional information is needed.  Incidence assumptions (consumers, labor,
and capital) need to be made and relative types and amounts of consumption need to be
identified.  Largely because of these additional requirements, we know of no studies of
poverty, which include the effect of indirect as well as direct taxes.
7. Recent papers and publications on poverty, inequality and social protection using LIS
include Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1999), Danziger and Jantti (1998), Smeeding
(1997), and Kenworthy (1998).
8. We deliberately exclude the newly reformed Central and Eastern European nations on the
grounds that their welfare states are in some ways remounts of the former Warsaw block
and are hence in a state of transition.
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9. The OECD Social Expenditures database allows users to separate benefits paid to the
elderly (households with a head or recipient aged 65 or older) and the nonelderly.  It also
permits us to separate health care spending from cash and nearcash benefits as in Figures
3A and 3B.
10. The indirect effects of social expenditure on pre-tax and transfer poverty are discussed
below.
11. This is not to recommend Australian income and means-tested social protection system to
anyone, but just to note that targeted spending produces greater poverty reduction per
dollar spent.
12. In Table 2 we use persons poverty rates but maintain the same household accounting
framework.
13. In Table 1 we exclude Spain and France because of the lack of comparable data on type
of worker.
14 The age line which separates the retired from workers is not always clear and may be less
than age 65 in many countries.  See Quinn and Smeeding (1998) on this topic.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Australia 1994
Full-year, full-time worker2 5.1 4.9 4.9 5.2 3.3 -35.3
Part-time worker, other3 31.6 30.3 30.3 30.9 18.5 -41.5
No Earners4 86.3 82.5 82.5 83.2 56.7 -34.3
Overall5 23.2 22.2 22.2 22.8 14.8 -36.2
Canada 1994
Full-year, full-time worker 4.9 4.4 2.6 3.3 2.9 -40.8
Part-time worker, other 42.8 38.7 25.3 28.0 23.9 -44.2
No Earners 90.7 77.9 65.0 66.9 58.8 -35.2
Overall 23.9 21.1 15.4 16.6 14.5 -39.3
Germany 1994
Full-year, full-time worker 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.4 0.0
Part-time worker, other 32.4 28.8 16.2 21.8 17.1 -47.2
No Earners 89.8 85.5 49.8 50.3 38.3 -57.3
Overall 19.0 17.7 10.3 12.1 9.4 -50.5
The Netherlands 1991
Full-year, full-time worker 2.5 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.8 -68.0
Part-time worker, other 31.3 26.7 16.5 22.2 14.6 -53.4
No Earners 91.2 69.8 32.6 36.8 17.9 -80.4
Overall 24.1 19.1 9.8 12.2 6.9 -71.4
Sweden 1992
Full-year, full-time worker 4.4 4.3 1.2 2.3 1.8 -59.1
Part-time worker, other 29.2 28.0 6.4 10.2 3.5 -88.0
No Earners 94.8 94.6 24.7 42.0 17.3 -81.8
Overall 20.7 20.1 5.0 8.5 3.8 -81.6
United Kingdom 1995
Full-year, full-time worker 1.6 1.5 0.6 1.6 0.9 -43.8
Part-time worker, other 34.2 27.7 20.9 24.1 13.6 -60.2
No Earners 77.2 66.6 56.8 57.6 34.0 -56.0
Overall 30.2 25.9 21.2 22.6 13.2 -56.3
United States 1994
Full-year, full-time worker 6.5 6.0 5.4 7.2 6.2 -4.6
Part-time worker, other 43.7 39.7 34.3 38.1 35.4 -19.0
No Earners 90.4 81.1 70.9 72.1 68.4 -24.3
Overall 23.2 21.0 18.4 20.5 18.9 -18.5
1
 Poverty measured at 50 percent of median adjusted household disposable income.  See Appendix Table A1 for
definitions of income categories and poverty rates.  All households are headed by an adult aged 25 to 64.
2
 Either the head or the spouse (or both) works full-year, full-time.  Full year is defined as 50 or more weeks of
employment.  Full-time is defined as 35 or more hours of employment.  For Australia 1994 number of weeks
of employment is missing so full-year, full-time employment is identified by  35 or more hours and the labor
force status of "employed full-time."
3
 Either the head or the spouse (or both) works part-year and/or part-time and has earnings, but neither works
full-year, full-time.  This is the residual of the first and third categories.
4
 Neither the head nor the spouse reports any earnings.
5
 All households headed by an adult aged 25-54.
Table 1
Household Poverty Rates by Income Source and Household Working Status1
(Household Head Aged 25-64)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Australia 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 21.8 20.8 20.8 21.3 12.3 -43.6
Couples with children2 16.2 15.8 15.8 16.4 10.6 -34.6
Solo Parents3 69.8 67.7 67.7 69.3 48.5 -30.5
Extended Families4 19.8 19.8 19.8 20.5 8.2 -58.6
Childless Adults5 23.1 21.7 21.7 22.1 12.2 -47.2
Elderly (65 and over) 79.5 73.0 73.0 73.2 32.8 -58.7
Canada 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 21.6 18.6 12.3 13.4 11.3 -47.7
Couples with children 16.3 15.6 10.1 11.4 9.9 -39.3
Solo Parents 61.8 59.4 52.3 53.3 47.6 -23.0
Extended Families 15.0 13.6 8.3 9.1 6.2 -58.7
Childless Adults 23.5 18.8 11.9 12.9 10.9 -53.6
Elderly (65 and over) 78.9 61.6 8.4 8.9 6.1 -92.3
France 1989
All Adults (aged 25-64) 27.3 26.7 9.8 10.4 8.5 -68.9
Couples with children 20.1 19.7 8.1 8.5 6.1 -69.7
Solo Parents 47.9 46.3 40.5 41.3 28.5 -40.5
Extended Families 28.2 28.1 11.0 11.8 8.6 -69.5
Childless Adults 31.6 30.8 9.5 10.2 9.3 -70.6
Elderly (65 and over) 86.6 86.2 17.9 18.7 16.7 -80.7
Germany 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 16.8 15.6 7.8 9.3 7.0 -58.3
Couples with children 9.0 9.0 6.3 7.9 5.9 -34.4
Solo Parents 62.5 56.5 51.2 55.8 50.4 -19.4
Extended Families 11.9 11.9 5.3 6.1 3.5 -70.6
Childless Adults 19.9 18.0 7.1 8.6 6.2 -68.8
Elderly (65 and over) 88.0 77.6 9.3 9.5 8.3 -90.6
The Netherlands 1991
All Adults (aged 25-64) 22.0 16.8 7.4 9.7 5.9 -73.2
Couples with children 9.0 8.7 5.0 7.0 5.6 -37.8
Solo Parents 79.5 72.0 55.3 59.9 31.5 -60.4
Extended Families 11.1 10.1 4.4 6.1 5.1 -54.1
Childless Adults 29.3 20.5 7.2 9.6 5.1 -82.6
Elderly (65 and over) 92.3 65.8 3.5 5.0 4.4 -95.2
Spain 19906
All Adults (aged 25-64) 24.3 23.4 10.6 na 9.9 -59.3
Couples with children 15.3 14.7 11.2 na 10.9 -28.8
Solo Parents 53.0 43.6 32.4 na 32.4 -38.9
Extended Families 22.9 22.1 9.5 na 8.9 -61.1
Childless Adults 31.4 30.4 10.5 na 9.5 -69.7
Elderly (65 and over) 72.0 68.6 15.6 na 13.0 -81.9
Table 2
Adult and Elderly Poverty Rates by Income Source1
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Sweden 19927
All Adults (aged 25-64) 18.1 17.7 4.0 6.6 3.1 -82.9
Couples with children 10.7 10.6 3.1 4.5 2.2 -79.4
Solo Parents 40.5 34.5 9.3 13.5 3.7 -90.9
Extended Families na na na na na na
Childless Adults 20.9 20.9 4.1 7.4 3.6 -82.8
Elderly (65 and over) 91.6 91.6 13.1 19.2 6.4 -93.0
United Kingdom 1995
All Adults (aged 25-64) 27.2 22.5 17.1 18.5 11.0 -59.6
Couples with children 20.4 19.5 16.9 18.8 12.3 -39.7
Solo Parents 77.8 74.2 71.8 72.6 43.2 -44.5
Extended Families 23.1 22.2 15.8 20.2 9.6 -58.4
Childless Adults 27.6 20.0 12.7 13.6 7.6 -72.5
Elderly (65 and over) 83.3 65.5 29.3 29.8 13.9 -83.3
United States 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 20.7 18.4 15.2 17.1 15.4 -25.6
Couples with children 13.1 12.6 11.3 13.3 11.8 -9.9
Solo Parents 59.0 55.2 52.0 55.0 48.7 -17.5
Extended Families 26.7 25.0 21.8 24.6 20.3 -24.0
Childless Adults 20.7 17.2 12.9 14.4 13.7 -33.8
Elderly (65 and over) 73.8 60.2 23.5 23.8 22.7 -69.2
1
 Poverty measured at 50 percent of median adjusted household disposable income.  See Appendix Table A1 for
definitions of income categories and poverty rates.
2
 Adults aged 25-64 living in households with children headed by a married or cohabiting couple with no
other adults present.
3
 Adults aged 25-64 living in households with children headed by an unmarried adult with no other adults present.
4
 Adults aged 25-64 living in households with children and adults other than the head and partner
(if married or cohabiting).
5
 Adults aged 25-64 living in households with no children present.
6
 Tax information is not available for Spain 1990.
7
 Can not identify extended families in Sweden 1992.
Adult and Elderly Poverty Rates by Income Source1
Table 2 (continued)
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1Percent of all persons with adjusted disposable incomes less than 40 or 50 percent of adjusted median disposable income.
Source: Author’s calculations from Luxembourg Income Study and Table A-2
Figure 2
Anti Poverty Effectiveness of Social Protection Systems:


















50% Market Income 50% Disposable Personal Income 40% Market Income 40% Disposable Personal Income
United 
Kingdom
Canada Spain France Germany SwedenUnited 
States
Australia Netherlands
1Percent of all persons with adjusted market income and then adjusted disposable income below the 50 or 40 percent of median adjusted disposable income.
Source: Author’s calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study and Table A-2.
Figure 3A
Relationship between Social Expenditure as a Percent of GDP1




































Notes: 1Social Expenditure as a percent of GDP is taken from OECD (1999). The most recent year is used in cases where the exact year is not available. Social Expenditure includes 
all public cash and near-cash expenditure for social protection. Health care is excluded.
2Poverty reduction is measured by the percentage reduction in poverty rates between market income and disposable income poverty (last column of Table 2).









Relationship between Social Expenditure as a Percent of GDP1












































Notes: 1Social Expenditure as a percent of GDP is taken from OECD (1999). The most recent year is used in cases where the exact year is not available. Social Expenditure includes 
all public cash and near-cash expenditure for social protection except for those received by the aged and survivors. Health care is also excluded.
2Poverty reduction is measured by the percentage reduction in poverty rates between market income and disposable income poverty (last column of Table 2).
Source: Author’s calculations from Luxembourg Income Study.
Source: Author’s calculations from Luxembourg Income Study.
Figure A-1























Elder Poverty Rate Child Poverty Rate
COUNTRY2 Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV
Australia AS81 AS85 AS89 AS94
Austria OS87 OS91 OS956
Belgium BE85 BE88/BE92 BE975
Canada CN71 CN75 CN81 CN87 CN91 CN94
Czech Republic CZ92 CZ966
Denmark DK87 DK92 DK956
Finland FI81 FI87 FI91 FI956
France3 FR79/FR81 FR84/FB84 FR89/FB89 FR945
Germany4 GE73 GE78 GE81/GE83 GE84 GE89 GE94
Hungary HU91 HU95
Ireland IR87 IR955
Israel IS79 IS86 IS92 IS97
Italy IT86 IT91 IT95
Luxembourg LX85 LX91 LX94
Netherlands NL83 NL86 /NL87 NL91 NL945
Norway NW79 NW86 NW91 NW95
Poland PL86 PL92 PL95
R.O.C.-Taiwan RC81 RC86 RC91 RC95
Russia RL92 RL95
Slovak Republic SV92 SV966
Spain SP80 SP90 SP956
Sweden SW67 SW75 SW81 SW87 SW92 SW955
Switzerland CH82 CH92 CH956
United Kingdom UK69 UK74 UK79 UK86 UK91 UK95
United States US69 US74 US79 US86 US91 US94/976
5Anticipated that this will be available during 1999.
6Will be available in 1999 or later.
Figure A-2
2We are also in negotiation with Greece (1995), Korea (1993), Mexico (1990), South Africa (1993). Japan (1993), and New 
Zealand (1995).
3France has an income survey (1979, 1984) and a budget survey (1984, 1989, 1994).
4Germany has three different databases: an income and expenditure survey (1973, 1978, 1983); a transfer income survey (1981); 
and three cross-sections from the Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) (1984,1989,1994)
Historical Databases
LIS DATABASE LIST:  Country and Year1




All income amounts are adjusted by E=0.5, as described above.
Market Income Earnings and cash property income.
Private Transfers
Taxes Payroll and income taxes.
Social Assistance
Transfers
Income-tested benefits, means-tested (income and wealth-tested) benefits, and 
emergency benefits, both and nearcash. The Earned Income Tax Credit in the United 
States and the Family Tax Credit are counted as social assistance in these nations, not 
as "negative taxes."
Occupational pension income, alimony, child support, private interfamily transfers 
and other cash income.
Universal and Social 
Transfers
Universal benefits and social insurance, including social retirement, survivors’ 
benefits, unemployment compensation, short and long term disability, maternal and 
paternal benefits, sickness benefits and child allowances.
Incomes are adjusted by E=0.5 where adjusted income = actual income divided by household size (s) to the power 
E.   Adjusted Income = Income/SE
Appendix Table A-1
Poverty Measurement and Definitions of Income Categories
The poverty rate is the percentage of  households (Table 1) or adults/elders (Table 2 and Appendix Table A-3), or 
all persons (adults/elders/children (Figures 1, 2 and Appendix Table A-2), with income less than a given percent 
of median adjusted disposable income for all persons. 
In Tables 1 and 2 the poverty percent of the medican is 50; in Appendix Table A-3 it is 40 percent; in Table A-2 
rates for 50 and 40 percent of the median are shown.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Australia 1994
50% median income 30.3 28.6 25.6 26.1 15.7 -48.2
40% median income 27.8 25.8 22.8 23.0 8.0 -71.2
Canada 1994
50% median income 30.5 25.5 12.5 13.5 11.2 -63.3
40% median income 27.2 21.9 9.0 9.3 6.6 -75.7
France 1989
50% median income 38.1 37.1 11.9 12.5 10.2 -73.2
40% median income 32.9 31.7 6.8 7.3 6.0 -81.8
Germany 1994
50% median income 31.3 28.2 8.5 9.8 7.6 -75.7
40% median income 29.4 25.9 5.8 6.6 4.1 -86.1
The Netherlands 1991
50% median income 33.5 25.3 8.0 10.4 6.7 -80.0
40% median income 32.5 23.6 7.2 8.3 4.2 -87.1
Spain 19902
50% median income 32.1 30.7 11.3 na 10.4 -67.6
40% median income 27.6 26.3 6.0 na 5.2 -81.2
Sweden 1992
50% median income 37.6 37.3 9.7 13.5 7.3 -80.6
40% median income 34.9 34.7 6.0 7.3 4.6 -86.8
United Kingdom 1995
50% median income 38.1 31.1 20.0 21.3 11.8 -69.0
40% median income 35.9 28.3 14.9 15.5 5.7 -84.1
United States 1994
50% median income 30.7 26.7 18.3 20.1 18.4 -40.1
40% median income 26.8 22.6 13.7 14.8 12.4 -53.7
1
  See Appendix Table A1 for definitions of income categories and poverty rates.
2
 Tax information is not available for Spain 1990.
Appendix Table A-2
Poverty Rates for All Persons by Income Source1
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Australia 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 19.1 17.9 17.9 18.1 6.3 -67.0
Couples with children2 13.0 12.6 12.6 12.9 5.7 -56.2
Solo Parents3 65.2 62.6 62.6 62.6 22.4 -65.6
Extended Families4 16.0 15.7 15.7 15.8 3.2 -80.0
Childless Adults5 21.0 19.3 19.3 19.5 6.3 -70.0
Elderly (65 and over) 78.0 70.1 70.1 70.1 14.4 -81.5
Canada 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 18.4 15.4 9.4 9.8 6.9 -62.5
Couples with children 12.8 12.2 7.0 7.3 5.3 -58.6
Solo Parents 56.9 54.2 46.4 46.7 29.8 -47.6
Extended Families 12.0 10.8 5.9 6.3 3.5 -70.8
Childless Adults 20.6 15.8 9.3 9.6 7.1 -65.5
Elderly (65 and over) 75.6 56.2 2.1 2.2 1.3 -98.3
France 1989
All Adults (aged 25-64) 21.9 21.2 5.9 6.4 5.2 -76.3
Couples with children 11.7 11.4 4.2 4.6 3.5 -70.1
Solo Parents 41.2 39.3 29.3 29.3 12.3 -70.1
Extended Families 20.2 19.9 6.3 6.6 4.8 -76.2
Childless Adults 28.9 27.9 6.1 6.8 6.2 -78.5
Elderly (65 and over) 84.2 83.8 8.9 9.5 9.1 -89.2
Germany 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 14.9 13.6 5.5 6.3 3.5 -76.5
Couples with children 7.2 7.0 4.3 5.3 2.7 -62.5
Solo Parents 57.5 53.1 45.3 49.5 32.7 -43.1
Extended Families 6.3 6.1 3.4 4.8 2.2 -65.1
Childless Adults 18.5 16.5 4.8 5.3 2.9 -84.3
Elderly (65 and over) 88.6 74.8 5.1 5.1 4.4 -95.0
The Netherlands 1991
All Adults (aged 25-64) 21.1 15.6 6.5 7.7 3.6 -82.9
Couples with children 8.3 8.0 4.3 5.3 3.6 -56.6
Solo Parents 78.6 70.6 51.9 54.4 14.3 -81.8
Extended Families 9.9 8.1 4.4 4.4 2.8 -71.7
Childless Adults 28.2 19.1 6.3 7.6 3.3 -88.3
Elderly (65 and over) 91.1 61.8 3.2 3.2 3.0 -96.7
Spain 19906
All Adults (aged 25-64) 19.7 18.9 5.9 na 5.4 -72.6
Couples with children 10.7 10.2 6.3 na 6.2 -42.1
Solo Parents 46.3 31.4 17.2 na 17.2 -62.9
Extended Families 16.8 16.1 5.6 na 5.1 -69.6
Childless Adults 27.7 26.7 5.5 na 4.8 -82.7
Elderly (65 and over) 68.3 64.8 6.6 na 4.6 -93.3
Appendix Table A-3
Adult and Elderly Poverty Rates for Persons by Income Source: 40 Percent of Median Poverty Line1
Sensitivity of Poverty Rates to Income Cutoff
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Col. A + Col. B + Col. C - Col. D + Percent 
Private Universal Social Change
Market Income and Social Assistance Columns
Income Transfers Transfers Taxes Transfers A to E
Sweden 19927
All Adults (aged 25-64) 15.8 15.6 3.1 4.1 1.8 -88.6
Couples with children 8.5 8.4 2.4 3.2 1.4 -83.5
Solo Parents 34.2 31.7 6.6 8.1 1.3 -96.2
Extended Families na na na na na na
Childless Adults 19.0 19.0 3.3 4.3 2.2 -88.4
Elderly (65 and over) 89.1 89.1 1.5 2.2 1.5 -98.3
United Kingdom 1995
All Adults (aged 25-64) 25.0 20.4 14.4 15.1 5.9 -76.4
Couples with children 17.9 17.2 14.4 15.4 7.2 -59.8
Solo Parents 75.4 71.0 65.8 67.3 16.2 -78.5
Extended Families 20.7 19.2 13.5 15.0 3.7 -82.1
Childless Adults 25.6 18.2 10.3 10.6 4.4 -82.8
Elderly (65 and over) 81.1 60.3 13.5 13.8 13.8 -83.0
United States 1994
All Adults (aged 25-64) 17.2 14.9 11.7 12.9 10.6 -38.4
Couples with children 9.5 9.1 7.9 9.1 6.6 -30.5
Solo Parents 51.8 48.3 45.1 46.9 38.3 -26.1
Extended Families 21.5 20.2 17.3 18.8 14.1 -34.4
Childless Adults 17.9 14.4 9.9 10.8 9.8 -45.3
Elderly (65 and over) 70.0 54.8 14.8 15.0 13.3 -81.0
1
 Poverty measured at 40 percent of median adjusted household disposable income.  See Appendix Table A1 for
definitions of income categories and poverty rates.
2
 Adults aged 25-64 living in households with children headed by a married or cohabiting couple with no
other adults present.
3
 Adults aged 25-64 in households with children headed by an unmarried adult with no other adults present.
4
 Adults aged 25-64 in households with children and adults other than the head and partner
(if married or cohabiting).
5
 Adults aged 25-64 in households with no children present.
6
 Tax information is not available for Spain 1990.
7
 Can not identify extended families in Sweden 1992.
Adult and Elderly Poverty Rates by Income Source: 40 Percent of Median Poverty Line1
Sensitivity of Poverty Rates to Income Cutoff




Children Solo Parents Families Childless Overall (65 and over) Total
Australia 1994 2,905 233 776 4,864 8,779 1,924 10,703
% of Overall 27.1 2.2 7.2 45.4 82.0 18.0 100.0
Canada 1994 4,860 500 1,542 8,391 15,293 3,243 18,536
% of Overall 26.2 2.7 8.3 45.3 82.5 17.5 100.0
France 1989 9,782 549 2,684 13,480 26,496 7,272 33,767
% of Overall 29.0 1.6 7.9 39.9 78.5 21.5 100.0
Germany 1994 13,045 979 3,112 23,735 40,871 12,278 53,149
% of Overall 24.5 1.8 5.9 44.7 76.9 23.1 100.0
The Netherlands 1991 2,895 191 497 4,415 7,999 1,900 9,899
% of Overall 29.2 1.9 5.0 44.6 80.8 19.2 100.0
Spain 1990 5,930 110 4,676 8,040 18,755 5,321 24,077
% of Overall 24.6 0.5 19.4 33.4 77.9 22.1 100.0
Sweden 1992 1,629 215 na 2,528 4,372 1,518 5,889
% of Overall 27.7 3.6 42.9 74.2 25.8 100.0
United Kingdom 1995 9,587 1,306 1,735 15,572 28,199 8,086 36,286
% of Overall 26.4 3.6 4.8 42.9 77.7 22.3 100.0
United States 1994 40,383 5,466 17,223 68,516 131,589 31,241 162,830
% of Overall 24.8 3.4 10.6 42.1 80.8 19.2 100.0
Panel B. Households
Full-year Part-time
 full-time worker No Earners Overall
Australia 1994 3,219 972 793 4,985
% of Overall 64.6 19.5 15.9 100.0
Canada 1994 5,629 1,771 1,099 8,499
% of Overall 66.2 20.8 12.9 100.0
France 1989 na na na na
% of Overall - - - 0.0
Germany 1994 14,802 5,534 2,639 22,975
% of Overall 64.4 24.1 11.5 100.0
The Netherlands 1991 2,769 930 879 4,578
% of Overall 60.5 20.3 19.2 100.0
Spain 1990 na na na na
% of Overall - - - 0.0
Sweden 1992 1,642 925 253 2,820
% of Overall 58.2 32.8 9.0 100.0
United Kingdom 1995 8,433 2,335 4,931 15,698
% of Overall 53.7 14.9 31.4 100.0
United States 1994 53,290 15,852 8,386 77,528
% of Overall 68.7 20.4 10.8 100.0
Source: Luxembourg Income Study
Adults Aged 25-64
Households Headed by 25-64 year old
Appendix Table A-4
Estimated Population Sizes in Thousands: Persons (Panel A) and Households (Panel B)
38
References
Atkinson, A.B. and G. Mogenson.  1993.  Welfare and Work Incentives:  A North European
Perspective.  Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press.
Atkinson, A.B., L. Rainwater, and T. Smeeding.  1995.  Income Distribution in OECD
Countries:  The Evidence from LIS.  Paris:  OECD.
Bradbury, B.  1989.  “Family Size Equivalence and Survey Evaluations of Income and Well-
Being,” Journal of Social Policy, 11(3): 383-408.
Buhmann, B., L. Rainwater, G. Schmaus, and T. Smeeding.  1988.  “Equivalence Scales, Well-
Being, Inequality and Poverty,” Review of Income and Wealth, 34(2) (June): 115-142.
Burkhauser, R.V., L. Aarts, and P. DeJong.  1996.  Curing the Dutch Disease:  An International
Perspective on Disability Reform.  Aldershot, UK:  Avebury Press.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Timothy M. Smeeding, and Joachim Merz.  1996.  “Relative Inequality
and Poverty in Germany and the United States Using Alternative Equivalence Scales,”
The Review of Income and Wealth, 42(4) (December):  242-263.
Burtless, G.  1999.  “Growing Inequality:  Sources and Remedies,” Brookings Review (Winter):
6-11.
Burtless, Gary.  1996.  “Trends in the Level and Distribution of U.S. Living Standards:  1973-
1993,” Eastern Economic Journal, 22(3) (Summer): 271-290.
Burtless, G. and R. Haveman.  1987.  “Taxes and Transfers:  How Much Economic Loss?”
Challenge (March-April):  45-51.
Cantillion, B., Y. Marx, and K. van den Bosch.  1996.  “Poverty in Advanced Economies:
Trends and Issues.”  Paper presented to the 24th General Conference of the International
Association for Research on Income and Wealth IARIW, Lillehammer, Norway, August.
Coleman, J.  1988.  “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal of
Sociology, 94: S95-S120.
Coleman, J. and L. Rainwater.  1978.  Social Standing in America.  New York:  Basic Books.
Danziger, S., R. Haveman, and R. Plotnick.  1981.  “How Income Transfer programs Effect
Work, Savings, and Income Distribution:  A Critical Assessment,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 19: 975-1028.
Danziger, S. and J. Jantti.  1998.  “Income Poverty in Advanced Countries.”  To appear in A.B.
Atkinson and F. Bourgignon (eds.), Handbook on Income Distribution.  New York:
Elsevier-North Holland Publishers, in press.
39
Duryea, S. and M. Székeley.  1998.  “Labor Markets in Latin America:  A Supply-Side Story,”
mimeo.  Washington, DC:  IADB, March.
Förster, M.  1993.  “Comparing Poverty in 13 OECD Countries:  Traditional and Synthetic
Approaches,” Studies in Social Policy Paper #10.  Paris:  OECD, October.
Foster, J., J. Greer, and E. Thorbecke.  1984.  “A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures,”
Econometrica, 52:  761-765.
Gottschalk, P. and T. Smeeding.  1998.  “Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality in
Industrialized Countries.”  In A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourgignon (eds.), Handbook of
Income Distribution:  Handbooks in Economics Series.  New York:  Elsevier-North
Holland Publishers, in press.
Gottschalk, P. and T. Smeeding.  1997.  “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income
Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (June): 633-686.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise.  1998.  “Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World,”
American Economic Review, 88(2) (May): 74-79.
Hagenaars, A., K. DeVos, and A. Zaidi.  1994.  “Patterns of Poverty in Europe.”  Paper
presented to the 23rd General Conference of the International Association for Research on
Income and Wealth, IARIW, St. Andrews, Canada, August.
Heston, A. and R. Summers.  1991.  “The Penn World Table (Mark 5):  An Expanded Set of
International Comparisons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2): 327-368.
Holzmann, R.  1998.  “A World Bank Perspective on Pension Reform,” Social Protection
Discussion Paper Series #9807.  Washington, DC:  The World Bank, April.
Holtzmann, R. and S. Jorgenson.  1999.  “Social Protection as Risk Management,” mimeo.
Washington, DC:  World Bank, January.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).  1998.  Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America.
Washington, DC:  Johns Hopkins Press.
Johnson, D. and T. Smeeding.  1998.  “Measuring the Trend in Inequality among Individuals and
Families:  Consumption or Income?” mimeo, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell
School.  Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse University, June.
Kenworthy, L.  1998.  “Do Social Welfare Policies Reduce Poverty?  A Cross-National
Assessment,” LIS Working Paper #191.  Differdange, Luxembourg, and Syracuse, NY:
Luxembourg Income Study, Syracuse University.
Lemieux, T. and W. MacLeod.  1998.  “Supply Side Hysteresis:  The Case of Canadian
Unemployment Insurance,” NBER Working Paper #6732.  Cambridge, MA:  National
Bureau for Economic Research.
40
Londono, J. and M. Székeley.  1997.  “Persistent Poverty and Excess Inequality:  Latin America,
1970-1995,” IADB Working Paper #357.  Washington, Dc: Inter-American Development
Bank, September.
Lustig, N. and R. Deutsch.  1998.  “The IADB and Poverty Reduction:  An Overview,” POV-
101-R.  Washington, DC:  IADB, May.
Mitchell, O.  1998.  “Building an Environment for Pension Reform in Developing Countries,”
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series #9803.  Washington, DC:  The World Bank,
January.
Moffitt, R.  1992.  “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System:  Athenian,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 30: 1-61.
Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  1998.  Purchasing Power
Parities.  Paris:  OECD.
Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  1999.  Social Expenditures
Database.  Paris:  OECD.
Overbye, E.  1997.  “Policy Responses to Household Vulnerability:  The Norwegian Case in an
International Context.” Paper presented to the Fourth International Research Seminar on
Social Security, Sigtuna, Sweden, June.
Quinn, J. and T. Smeeding.  1998.  “Cross-National Patterns of Labor Force Withdrawal.”  In P.
Flora et al. (eds.), The State of Social Welfare, 1997.”  International Studies in Social
Security Series #4.  London:  Ashgate Publishers, pp. 83-115.
Rainwater, L.  1990.  “Poverty and Equivalence as Social Constructions,” LIS Working Paper
#91, Luxembourg Income Study.  Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse University.
Rainwater, L.  1974.  What Money Buys.  New York:  Basic Books.
Ramprakash, D.  1995.  “Poverty in Europe,” European Journal of Social Policy, 15(1): 161-68.
Ravallion, M.  1997.  “Can High Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute Poverty?”
Economic Letters, 56: 51-57.
Ravallion, M.  1998.  “Poverty Lines in Theory and Partners,” Living Standards Measurement
Paper No. 2133.  Washington, DC:  The World Bank, July.
Ravallion, M., G. Datt, and D. van de Walle.  1991.  “Quantifying Absolute Poverty in the
Developing World,” Review of Income and Wealth, 37: 345-361.
Ravallion, M. and M. Loshkin.  1998.  “Subjective Economic Welfare,” mimeo.  Washington,
DC:  The World Bank, September.
Schmidt, C. and M. Gora.  1998.  “Long Term Unemployment, Unemployment Benefits and
Social Assistance:  The Polish Experience,” Empirical Economics, 123:  122-139.
41
Sen, A.  1992.  Inequality Reexamined.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.
Sen, A.  1976.  “Poverty:  An Ordinal Approach to Measurement,” Econometrica, 46: 437-446.
Skévik, A.  1997.  “The State-Parent Relationship After Family Break-Up:  Child Maintenance
in Norway and Britain.” Paper presented to the Fourth International Research Seminar on
Social Security, Sigtuna, Sweden, June.
Smeeding, T.  1997.  “Poverty in Developed Countries:  The Evidence from LIS,” Poverty and
Human Development, 1997.  New York:  United Nations, pp. 195-240.
Smeeding, T.  1997a.  “U.S. Income Inequality in a Cross-National Perspective:  Why are We So
Different?”, Looking Ahead, XIX(2-3): 41-50.  Reprinted in J. Auerbach and R. Belous
(eds.), The Inequality Paradox:  Growth of Income Disparity.  Washington, DC:
National Policy Association, 1998, pp. 194-217.
Smeeding, T., S. Danziger, and L. Rainwater.  1997.  “Child Well-Being in the West:  Toward a
More Effective Antipoverty Policy.”  In G. Andrea Cornia and S. Danziger (eds.), Child
Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries of the East and West.  London,
UK:  Oxford University Press, pp. 368-389.
Smeeding, T., K. Ross, P. England, K. Christopher, and S. McLanahan.  1998  “Poverty and
Parenthood across Modern Nations:  Findings from the Luxembourg Income Study,” LIS
Working Paper #193, Luxembourg Income Study.  Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse University.
Sullivan, D. and T. Smeeding.  1998.  “Generations and the Distribution of Economic Well-
Being:  A Cross-National View,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,
88(2) (May): 254-258.
Townsend, P.  1979.  Poverty in the United Kingdom.  Harmendsworth:  Penguin Books.
United Nations.  1997.  Human Development Report.  New York:  United Nations Human
Development Office.
United Nations.  1998.  Human Development Report.  New York:  United Nations Human
Development Office.
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  1998.,  “Poverty in the United States:  1997,” Current Population
Reports, Series, P-60, No. 201.  Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office.
World Bank.  1990.  World Development Report.  New York: Oxford University Press.
